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Sciences, Uppsala, Sweden
In this article, we analyze how participants perform disagreement in meetings organized
with the explicit purpose of managing through dialogue conflicts concerning natural
resources in Sweden. How is a conversation initiated about something that participants
disagree about? How do they clarify to each other that, about what, and why they
disagree? How do they show that they understand it is like that and what do they do when
this is clear to them? Answers to these questions are important because, if dialogue is
to contribute to the constructive development of conflict situations, dialogue should be
regarded as a forum where disagreement is expressed and developed, rather than as a
forum and tool for consensus. We conducted a sequential analysis of how disagreement
is performed and accomplished in normative dialogues in which participants talk about
how to reduce the negative impact of wildlife populations—such as predators and
grazing birds—on human activities such as domestic reindeer husbandry and crop
farming. The analysis shows that disagreement is articulated in ways that do not
seem to make ontological, epistemological and axiological differences among positions
clear for participants. We identified six procedures through which disagreements are
(not) accomplished in these conversations. This shows that routines and procedures
in normative dialogue are characterized by consensus-preferences not helpful for
agonistic dialogue. In order to avoid situations where dialogue leads to discursive
closures, standards and procedures that facilitate articulation of disagreement need to
be developed.
Keywords: agonistic pluralism, radical democracy, dialogue, environmental conflict, disagreement, natural
resource management
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INTRODUCTION
Conflict is a social phenomenon that sets the scene for policy and
administrative processes in environmental and natural resource
management and sustainability adaptationseems that actors in
natural resource of society (Blackburn and Bruce, 1995; Daniels
and Walker, 2001; Gray, 2003; Sidaway, 2005). A frequently
discussed question is how the political, administrative, and
communication systems involved in these processes should relate
to the occurrence of conflicts (Peterson and Franks, 2006) and
the constructive and destructive social processes associated with
conflicts (Johnson et al., 2006; Hallgren, 2016; Raitio, 2016;
Kriesberg and Dayton, 2017).
Often, the word “dialogue” is used by both analysts and
practitioners of environmental and natural resourcemanagement
to describe the normativity of social processes aimed at
facilitating constructivity in environmental conflict (Carpenter
and Kennedy, 1988; Forester and Theckethil, 2009; Muro and
Jeffrey, 2012; Mårald et al., 2015). Views on the nature of the
normativity that characterizes dialogue are divided, as are those
on what communicative practices and procedures are associated
with that normativity.
In this article we analyze how participants in meetings
organized with the explicit purpose of dealing with conflict
and paradoxical goals regarding natural resources in Sweden
through dialogue, perform disagreement together. We call these
situations “normative dialogue” to indicate that the involved
actors explicitly express the expectation that communication
in dialogue is of a particular quality, with a discourse
ethics different from what is characteristic of other political
and administrative contexts. Although it is often unclear
what kind of normativity characterizes dialogue (Carbaugh
et al., 2011; Ganesh and Holmes, 2011; Ganesh and Zoller,
2012), it seems that actors in natural resource management
take it for granted that dialogue implies special conditions
for communication and creates something good, which is
better than other forms of collaboration. However, we are
not interested in the discourse ethics of natural resource
management actors, but in their discourse practice: How
does the communicative practice in these normative dialogues
accomplish disagreement? How is a conversation initiated about
something that the participants disagree about, and how do
they clarify to each other THAT they disagree, and about
WHAT and WHY? How do they show each other that they
understand that is so and what do they do when this is clear to
them?
The answers to these questions are important because
it has been noted that, if dialogue is to contribute to
the constructive development of conflict situations, dialogue
should be regarded as a forum where disagreement is
expressed and developed, rather than being assumed as forum
and tool for reaching consensus (Ganesh and Zoller, 2012;
Davidson, 2016). This agonistic view of the relationship
between conflict and dialogue is based on the view that
conflict is constitutive for, and constantly present in, society
(Mouffe, 2005; Aggestam et al., 2015; Maddison and Diprose,
2017). An agonistic, democratic governance characterizes, in
(Mouffe (1996), p. 8) words, “its envisaging the diversity
of conceptions of the good, not as something negative that
should be suppressed but as something to be valued and
celebrated.”
The constructive aspect of conflict is that tensions between
interests create pluralism and creativity (Johnson et al., 2006)
while, at the same time, revealing the presence of power relations
and hegemony (Laclau, 2014) in society. Acknowledgment
of conflict thus forces society to reconstruct institutions and
structures, procedures, language, and knowledge and to engage
with the diversity of perspectives. The destructive aspect of
conflict is that community actors who worry about being
dominated by a competitive perspective, in their attempts to
maintain or regain their agency, limit each other’s agency,
and in extreme cases, existence. Therefore, conflict may also
reduce the diversity of perspectives (Hallgren, 2003; Ångman
et al., 2011). Conflict is a form of social interaction through
which these constructive and destructive processes are created.
Already, sociologist Simmel (1964) found that conflict, Kampf,
is associative to the same extent that it is dissociative, because
actors who fight each other’s attempts to dominate are connected
in a relationship. Mouffe (2013) has argued that political identity
is created in the tension between “us” and “them” in conflict,
and claims that although antagonism can take many forms, it is
illusory to believe that antagonism between “us” and “them” can
ever be eradicated. This is why it is important to allow conflict
an agonistic form of expression, in which actors challenge each
other’s ideas but not their legitimacy to represent these ideas
in the debate. When conflict takes shape as agonism “others
are not seen as enemies to be destroyed but as adversaries
whose ideas might be fought, even fiercely but whose right to
defend those ideas is not to be questioned” (Mouffe, 2013, p.
7). So, the performance of disagreement is obviously important,
since, as Mouffe put it, “a democratic society requires a debate
about possible alternatives and it must provide political forms of
collective identification around clearly differentiated democratic
positions” (Mouffe, 2005, p. 30–31).
For agonistic pluralism to be performed in normative
dialogue, it is necessary to have communicative procedures
through which disagreement can be articulated and investigated.
However, studies in conversation analysis have revealed that
assessment statements in conversations are organized in ways
that give sequential preference to agreeing answer (Pomerantz,
1984), that is, agreeing demands less communicative effort than
disagreeing. Subsequently, disagreeing answers to assessments
have been found to include weaker claims than agreeing answers,
and have often been delayed, and preceded by control questions
or even include agreeing turns before the disagreeing turn,
for example, the common turn construction “Yes, but. . . .”
Pomerantz (1984, p. 64) argues that “agreement turns and
sequences are structured so as to maximize the occurrences of
stated agreements, and disagreement turns and sequences so as
to minimize the occurrences of stated disagreements.” When a
participant in a conversation “hears a co-participant’s assessment
being completed and his or her own disagreement is relevant
and due, he or she may produce delays, such as no talk, request
for clarification, partial repeats, and other repair initiators and
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turn prefaces” (Pomerantz, 1984, p. 72). Additionally, in more
formal conversations where expressing disagreement to some
extent is the purpose of the conversation, such as in assessment
panels in art exhibitions, conversation analysis has demonstrated
that conversational procedures for avoiding disagreement, such
as topic jumping, are used (Osvaldsson, 2004; McKinlay and
McVittie, 2006).
So, what concrete interactive forms for performing agonism
or disagreement are available in the orderly processes that we
call normative dialogue? And has normative dialogue become so
impregnated by norms preferring consensus that articulation of
disagreement is systematically avoided through the interactive
practices and procedures performed and maintained in
normative dialogue?
METHODS AND ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK
To highlight the communicative forms under which agonism
can take place in the normative dialogues that have become so
common in the administration of environmental and natural
resource management, we have identified situations where actors
meet and participate in what they themselves call dialogue. We
have observed, recorded, and transcribed these conversations,
and analyzed how sequences of disagreement are interactively
performed. Our data have been extracted from a total of ∼30 h
of recorded meeting time, captured from 9 dialogue meetings,
each of a duration of between 2 and 5 h. Of these meetings,
6 concern the problem of predator killing of reindeers, and 3
concern the problem of crop raiding by big grazing birds like
cranes, swan, and geese. The hosts of the meeting, which in
all cases were nature conservation authorities, were contacted
by researchers with request for permission to attend, observe,
and record the meetings. During the meetings, the researchers
briefly introduced themselves and presented a brief and general
account of the research. During the formal part of the meeting,
the researchers remained in the background and administrated
recording devices and took notes. During breaks and after
the meetings, researchers participated in conversations. All
participants have given their oral informed consent to recording
and for the records to be used for research purpose. The Swedish
law (FS, 2003:460) and the Swedish research council do not
demand approval from external ethical committee in cases of
participant observation.
In reading the transcript we have searched for sequences
that have been characterized by disagreement and, through
sequential analysis, have identified different ways in which
disagreement is initiated and addressed in the conversation. We
have used a definition of disagreement that mainly refers to
disagreements after the third turn. This refers to situations where
an interlocutor makes a claim or proposal that is contradicted
in a statement performed by another interlocutor, and the
first speaker maintains or defend the original claim (McKinlay
and McVittie, 2006). However, we have not limited ourselves
to disagreements after the third turn, but have also analyzed
sequences with subtler markers for disagreement.
”The theoretical point of departure of this analysis is
social constructionism and interactionism (Linell, 2009), and
this analysis sees social situations and structures as being
accomplished and performed intersubjectively through social
interaction” (Goffman, 1983; Heritage and Clayman, 2010).
Disagreement is not just a frame for conversations, nor
a consequence of conversations, but disagreement is made
through interaction; hence, it matters how disagreement is
carried out. An important concept for understanding how
disagreements are handled in conversations is constitutive
expectancies (Watson, 2009), the intersubjective expectations
interlocutors share about the content and form of conversations
(Garfinkel, 1963). Garfinkel demonstrated in a series of classic
experiments that, when a conversation participant violates
intersubjective expectations, it will lead to doubts about
intersubjectivity and doubts that communication is at all
possible. This will subsequently result in a communication
breakdown, followed by the reconstruction of new, more
suspicious constitutive expectations (Watson, 2009). In order
to avoid a conversation ending in a breach of constitutive
expectations, the daily repertoire has tools for detecting as well
as repairing misunderstandings that could lead to violations of
constitutive expectations (Schegloff, 1992).
Although we have a social constructivist focus and see
sequential organization of conversations as an important piece
of the puzzle for understanding the prerequisites for agonistic
dialogue in natural resource conflicts, we have chosen not
to conduct a regular conversation analysis according to the
transcription convention developed by Jefferson (2004). Our
transcripts have been made in Swedish and indicate the words
we can hear pronounced, but not the phonetics or details in the
interaction. The reason we have not done so is that we judged that
we did not need that level of detail and dissolution in our analysis.
The translation of quotes from Swedish to English has been done
after the analysis.
THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF
WILDLIFE DISAGREEMENTS AND
NORMATIVE DIALOGUE
The purpose of this study is to discuss the communicative
conditions for agonistic dialogue in the field of natural resource
management by analyzing how disagreements are interactively
achieved in meetings organized with the explicit aim of dealing
with conflicts and paradoxical goals through dialogue. We have
no explicit ambition to explain the causes, the development
and the consequences of these conflict situations, but only to
show how disagreements are made in the current conversations.
However, these conversations take place in situations of quite
high contextual density. Schegloff (1997) suggests that the
context of talk-in-interaction is defined through, and in talk-in-
interaction when the participants in these conversations relate
to the context. With a social constructivist perspective, context
is situated and emergent. Schegloff stresses that the analysts
need to understand the participants’ endogenous orientations
toward their context through paying attention to references to
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the context created in talk-in-interaction, and how this context is
made meaningful in the interaction. This is important, otherwise
the analyst risk imposing their interpretation of a context on the
situation and its participants.We agree with Schegloff ’s argument
for taking locally and interactively produced perspectives on
context seriously. However, we also think that in the kind
of complex context that we are analyzing, the conversation
participants refer to layers and layers of meaning and it becomes
very difficult for an outsider to understand the references to
context made in the turns, and how they relate to references
in other turns, without a preunderstanding of the interactional
history. Therefore, we think that the analysts also need to
take into consideration other sources to context than the local
talk-in-interaction. Therefore, we will provide some of our
understanding of the context of these situations, and discuss
some institutional and contextual factors that we believe are
important for the understanding of what transpires during
these conversations. This is not about intruding on participants’
endogenous orientation toward context; it is about providing
enough intersubjectivity to make the participants’ references to
context visible for the analyst and the reader of the analysis.
The concrete conversations we have studied deal with two
different natural resource dilemmas: problems for reindeer
herders due to reindeer being killed by predators such as wolves,
wolverines, lynx, bears, and eagles, which are protected by the
European Habitats Directive1; and problems for farmers due to
crop damage caused by grazing birds (cranes, barnacle geese,
swans), protected by the European Birds Directive2. We will, for
the sake of simplicity, label these cases “reindeer-predator” and
“agriculture-cranes.” This way of describing what the participants
in the observed conversations are talking about is, of course,
a misleading simplification and generalization, and it could be
described in quite different ways. It is not predators, reindeer
and birds, and their respective needs, that are at the center of
the conversation, but people and their expectations, worries,
and relationships. Nevertheless, we will devote some space to
describing reindeer husbandry, predators, grazing birds, and
farms, the relationships among them, and the policies that
regulate their prerequisites.
Reindeer husbandry has been conducted by Sami
communities in Sweden since the sixteenth century (Lantto,
2012). Sami refers to an indigenous population living in
what is now considered Swedish, Norwegian, Finnish and
Russian national territory. The Sami society, including reindeer
husbandry, has been affected by changes in politics in the
colonizing countries; Sami language, religion, and apparel have
been banned or stigmatized (Lindmark and Sundström, 2016)
with different intensities in different time periods until the
contemporary period, and Sami livelihoods and economy have
been influenced in various ways by political decisions that the
Sami lacked influence over (Lantto, 2012; Larsen et al., 2017).
Reindeer husbandry is a focal point of the Sami culture and one
of the factors that has always affected reindeer husbandry is the
1The formal name is Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the Conservation of natural
habitats and of wild fauna and flora.
2Council Directive 2009/147/EC on the conservation of wild birds.
presence of predators (Forbes et al., 2006). To put it simply,
wolves, wolverines, lynxes, bears, and eagles kill reindeer. The
Sami’s relationship with these predators is also something that
has changed over time, and as a result of decisions by various
Swedish parliaments. The Sami communities were obliged by
Swedish authorities to hunt in order to decimate the Swedish
predator population until the beginning of twentieth century,
when it was decided that predators should be protected to avoid
extinction. As a consequence of previous management strategies,
predator populations in the latter half of the twentieth century
were very small and had little impact on reindeer husbandry.
However, since the 1980s these populations have recovered and
currently around 40,000 domesticated reindeer are killed by
predators per year, and some Sami communities are experiencing
a substantial decline in herd size (Åhman et al., 2014). Today,
Sami organizations consider predators killing reindeer to be
a major threat to the economic and social sustainability of
reindeer husbandry, and they argue politically that predator
population management policies should be changed based on
the needs of reindeer husbandry3. According to observations
and calculations, about 30–45 percent of the reindeer (winter
herd) are killed by predators. A Sami community experiencing a
predator problem can apply for protection culling; and culling
has to be approved by the nature conservation authority. Wolves,
lynx, and wolverines are protected by the European Union
Habitats Directive. The Swedish parliament has decided that
each Sami community should withstand losses of up to 10
percent of its herds, but has not provided any tools for managing
the situation. The meetings that have been observed for this
study aim at developing a “tolerance level plan” through dialogue
between the conservation authority (county administrative
board) and local Sami communities. The plan document should
describe the respective conditions of reindeer husbandry and the
impact of predators on the community, and propose measures
to reduce losses until they reach <10 percent. Meetings take
place at the initiative of the nature conservation authority and
are led by a public officer. Each Sami community participates in
four meetings and each meeting has a theme, but the meeting
structure is informal and they last between two and 5 hours. In
the observed meetings, each Sami community was represented
by two to five representatives. There was no explicit, formalized
meta-communicative talk about managing disagreement, and no
pre-decided procedures for taking turns, expressing diverging
opinions, or any other explicated communicative techniques
or a formalized code of conduct. However, there was implicit
meta-communicative talk which reveals mutual assumptions
that these meetings are supposed to be different from previous
meetings and productive. The civil officer explicitly says that the
Sami community knows better the situation of reindeer herding,
and that they should represent their own perspective. The civil
officer also repeatedly emphasizes that “the plan” is important,
and that more the effort and creativity invested in “the plan,”
more likely it is that the goals of reducing predation, without
risking long term survival of the predator population, will be
achieved.
3Sapmi 2018, July 27 Retrieved from http://www.sapmi.se/rovdjur-och-renar/
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Cranes, geese, and swans are large birds that feed on
fields in the agricultural landscape, especially in connection
with wetlands. In Sweden, these birds were quite rare 40
years ago and the birds are protected by both national and
international legislation, including the European Birds Directive.
In recent decades, these species have had a strong population
growth, and the birds now appear in very large numbers at
staging sites during the spring and autumn migrations (Nilsson
et al., 2018). Staging sites are often located in low-altitude
agricultural areas adjacent to wetlands. Often these wetlands
are remnants of lakes that were drained during agricultural
rationalization in the nineteenth century, and then restored
as wetlands through nature conservation measures during the
1990s.
Farmers cultivating farms in areas close to such wetlands
with high bird densities experience problems of crop damage,
both during the birds’ spring and fall migration and from birds
that nest in the area during summer. The regional Nature
Conservation Authority acknowledges these problems and offers
financial compensation for crop damage and employs staff to
administer “scarecrows” and distraction feeding to divert the
birds from commercial crops. Since the birds are included in
the Birds Directive, hunting with the purpose of reducing the
population is not allowed. In interviews which the authors
conducted with public officers working on these questions for a
long time, it emerged that some farmers believe that the wetland
restorations carried out by the nature conservation authority for
nature protection purposes are to blame for the rapid increase
in bird populations and consequent crop damages. The three
meetings we observed were organized by the nature conservation
authority, in which farmers were invited to discuss, evaluate, and
decide on measures to reduce crop damage. Between 10 and
20 farmers attended each meeting. The public officer chaired
the meetings, and one or two representatives of the authority
attended the meetings. A bird researcher also attended the
meetings and presented research results. In the beginning of the
meeting, the public officer chairing the meeting presented the
agenda, which consisted of presentations by the public officer and
the bird researcher, followed by a small group discussion among
the farmers to make decisions on adopting measures for the next
year to reduce crop raiding. The presentations were about birds’
feeding behavior, population dynamics, migration behavior, and
the administration and measures taken by the authorities to
reduce crop raiding. The presenters said explicitly that questions
were welcome during the speech (and many questions were
asked). Except the instruction that questions could be asked, and
later during the meeting the instructions to talk about future
strategies in small groups, no other explicit, formalized meta-
communicative talk took place. There was no discussion on
managing disagreement.
In the meetings we observed, participants talked about
epistemological and axiological questions related to the themes
of predators preying on reindeer and crop damage by birds,
and about their mutual relationships, power relations and
meta-communication. In either case, an authority responsible
for management of protected wildlife encountered a group of
stakeholders who experience problems due to the presence
of the wildlife. In both cases, the conversation was preceded
by mass media and public discussions about the problems,
and it appears to be common knowledge in society that
these management issues result from incompatible goals and
that different actors in society disagree about how society
should prioritize these goals; to create better conditions for
reindeer husbandry and agriculture, or to protect wildlife.
There seems to be disagreement about epistemology (what
you know about the situation, how do you know it and if
knowledge can be trusted) and axiology (how it should be,
what interest should be given priority and who is responsible
for problems and change). In order to handle these concrete
situations, the involved actors have met and discussed the present
situation and future plans. In both cases, the observed meetings
were initiated by the authorities, and the explicit purpose
of the conversation was to identify and/or evaluate practical
solutions for reducing problems for stakeholders, without
bending the rules or violating measures for the protection of
wildlife.
SIX WAYS TO (NOT) PERFORM
DISAGREEMENT
In our material, we found sequences in which what we call
third-turn disagreement was performed, as well as sequences
with other less clear markers for disagreement. In some cases,
it appeared to us as external viewers, with knowledge of the
overall contextual conditions, as if a conversation partner tried
to initiate an incompatibility, which, for different reasons,
was not interactively constituted as a third-turn disagreement.
However, in either third-turn disagreements or in the less explicit
initiations of disagreement, the disagreement was not maintained
after the fourth, fifth, or Nth turn. In fact, we could not find
any examples of situations where more fundamental differences
in epistemological, ontological, ethical, axiological, or meta-
communicative positions were expressed or where the actors
addressed the power relationships that hid the disagreement.
Instead, we identified in our material six different types of
procedures for not maintaining disagreement, which were
collaboratively applied by participants.
1 The disagreement is initiated and articulated as disagreement
after third turn but reconstructed in the Nth turn into
consensus or creative problem-solving after argumentation,
persuasion, compulsion, or manipulation.
2 The disagreement is initiated as disagreement after third turn
but interrupted and postponed after the second, third, or Nth
turn.
3 Participants deploy jokes as indicators but not performers of
disagreement.
4 Questions are used as proxies for initiation of disagreement but
not treated as disagreement after the first turn.
5 Equivocal initiation of disagreement leads to doubts about
intersubjectivity.
6 Disagreement appears as a meta-discursive object but is not
performed.
Frontiers in Communication | www.frontiersin.org 5 December 2018 | Volume 3 | Article 56
Hallgren et al. (Not) Performing Disagreement in NRM-Dialogue
We will develop how these types of not-performed, not-
maintained, and un-completed disagreements work, with the
help of examples from our material.
The Disagreement Is Initiated and
Articulated as Disagreement After
Third-Turn but Reconstructed in the Nth
Turn Into Consensus or Creative
Problem-Solving After Argumentation,
Persuasion, Compulsion, or Manipulation
These sequences typically occur when any of the interlocutors
involved in a third-turn disagreement give up their claim after the
third turn of the disagreement: An interlocutor makes a claim or
proposal, which is questioned or denied by another interlocutor.
The first interlocutor denies the rejection and retains the claim,
but in a following turn, one of the interlocutors changes his or her
claim and accepts the proposal of the other or suggests alternative
positions.
In one sequence, a Sami community’s need for protective
culling of lynxes was discussed. The public official asked how
many lynxes the Sami community believed should be killed. The
Sami community representative answered that they did not think
they should mention a number and the public officer exclaimed
in the third turn, “But we have to.” After some hesitation, a
representative of the Sami community proposed a number and
they continued to talk about the relevance of that number.
In another sequence, a public officer proposed that, in order
to estimate how many bears are present and potentially killing
reindeer calves in an area topographically inaccessible to humans,
they could kill a moose and place its carcass in the area,
monitored by a remote camera, to film the presence of bears.
The representatives of the Sami community responded that it
is impossible to shoot a moose during the off-season even with
a permit, since the moose-hunting locals (other than the Sami)
would be upset and protest against off-season hunting; “The
moose is sacred,” they said. After some discussion, the public
officer suggested that bears can be attracted to the camera with
corn instead of a moose carcass. They also developed the idea that
the corn might not just be good for attracting bears to the camera
for counting, but also draw the bears away from the reindeer
calving area. A disagreement after third turn was thus transposed
into creative problem-solving.
Disagreement Is Initiated but Canceled and
Postponed After the Second, Third, or Nth
Turn
A typical sequence of a postponed disagreement is initiated by
one party expressing a desire for something that the other party
should perform. The other party indicates in turn two that there
is a problem with the wish, and then announces that the matter
will be dealt with on another occasion.
In one meeting, the representative of a Sami community
said, “But then, we have to get our own protection culling for
wolverines.” Until then, three neighboring Sami communities
had shared a culling permit and experienced stress because of
the competition over who would be the first to track and shoot
more wolverines on their own territory, and leave no space for
the other two communities to kill the wolverines active in their
territory. The public officer replied that he was surprised that the
Sami communities had not shown more engagement in actually
performing the culling in the previous years, and then said, “We’ll
take a look at it.” The disagreement was thus canceled after
the second turn and postponed to an indefinite future, and the
difference in viewpoint on culling was not further expressed or
investigated.
Participants Deploy Jokes as Indicators
but Not Performers of Disagreement
Another way that disagreement was indicated but not completed
in the dialogues studied was through jokes and irony. In one
sequence, participants talked about what methods could be
used for protection culling of the secluded wolverine. The
representatives of the public authority and the Sami agreed that
it is exceptionally difficult to hunt wolverines, especially due to
the topology of the landscape inhabited by this particular Sami
community. Different methods were discussed but none were
found appropriate. One of the Sami community representatives
said, “In the 1930s, they had something which was fairly effective,”
and someone else filled in “Strychnine.” “Exactly,” responded the
first representative. Everyone laughed, and the public officer said
that the use of poison during the 1930s was the reason they were
now facing difficulties with legal means for culling. He implied
that the effectiveness of previous attempts to eradicate predators
was the reason why the measures for the protection of these
animals were now so strong, curtailing the opportunities of the
Sami community for protecting their reindeer. The discussion
continued, and a half hour later they returned to the same
idea, when another of the community representatives said, “We
cannot use poison, can we?” The participants laughed again and
continued the conversation. It seemed as if the participants were
fully aware that the proposals for poison and strychnine were
not serious. However, they were indicating the absurdity they
perceived in trying to figure out how to make the wolverines kill
less reindeer, when tools for achieving that purpose were missing.
Through suggesting poison and demonstrating full awareness of
the lack of legitimacy and appropriateness of the proposition,
they suggested that all other culling methods are considered
ineffective. However, when this meaning was expressed through
a joke, any disagreement about it was not available for joint
investigation.
Questions Are Used as Proxies for
Initiation of Disagreement, but Not Treated
as Disagreement After the First Turn
Sometimes, in our material, actors asked questions that seemed
to be pretexts or agents for initiations of disagreement. However,
as a result of their ambiguous design, the interlocutor did not
respond to them as to an initiation of disagreement, but did so
as to the open question that they may also have appeared as.
Consequently, the articulation of disagreement became delayed
or missing. The ambiguous initiations of disagreement may have
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been questions about facts, the significance of a technical term
or a question of how the other player addressed a particular
situation or an expected outcome. It seemed that the initiator
of the question assumed that the answer to the question would
lead to a binary or confrontational formulation of disagreement.
However, on several occasions, these initiations were made
without leading to disagreement after third turn, since the
question was responded to as a request for information or
explanation.
The following sequences of talk-in-interaction took place at
a meeting with the explicit purpose of evaluating a measure
called “distraction field,” which had been tested to reduce crop
damage in the summer, and to decide whether the action should
be repeated in the following year.We will look at a few sequences,
all originating from the same episode of about 15min, where
participants asked questions with what seemed like the purpose
of bringing the conversation to a point where a disagreement
would become visible; however, it did not happen. During the
meeting, farmers repeatedly asked questions about how much
the crane population had increased, in what seemed to be an
attempt to initiate a disagreement about whether cranes should
continue to be protected when the population had increased so
rapidly, or if hunting or other population-reducing measures
should be allowed, and who was responsible for the damage
that they considered to be caused by the cranes. However, the
public officers chairing the meeting and the crane researcher
present there—who had been invited by the nature conservation
authority—dealt with these questions as if they were purely
epistemological questions and did not initially treat them as
an initiation of disagreement. In their answers, they talked
about methodological problems in counting birds, impact from
daylight, and so on. Other farmers confirmed the epistemological
interpretation of the question by asking follow up questions
about the counting method, the number of cranes at different
geographical locations, how to read the charts and the number
of cranes during different years. So far in the discussion, one
farmer made an explicit meta-communicative (see Disagreement
practice number 6) articulation of a problem, and raised an
implicit question about whether there was a disagreement about
that problem.
1 Farmer A: But there is something I cannot make sense of, or
there are lots of things I cannot make sense of. . . but should
we attract birds here when we do not want them to be here? It
seems to be a conflict of interest.
2 Public officer: Yes, there is always a risk of attracting more
birds than it has been otherwise.
3 Farmer A: Because four cranes may be fun to look at, but four
thousand are not a thousand times more fun.
4 Farmer B: How many cranes were there 5 years ago, when you
were counting in the fall?
However, the investigation of a possible disagreement initiated
in turns one to three is interrupted when another farmer in
turn four—in an attempt, as far as we understand, to strengthen
the problem description—redirected the conversation back to
questions about the numbers of cranes over the years. The
question about the number of cranes 5 years ago is used as
a proxy for initiating a disagreement, but the initiation of the
disagreement fails. Moreover, the disagreement which was on its
way to be initiated in turn one to three is interrupted by the
discussion about the number of cranes. In the next sequence,
which follows directly after the previous one, the public officer,
different farmers, and the crane researcher talk about the number
of cranes and counting methods. The farmers continue asking
questions, as if the questions would reveal the disagreement, but
that is not the result of the interaction.
5 Public officer: Yes, the figures from the fall counting I will show
you soon [words omitted]
6 Farmer B: But were the number of cranes this year 25 thousand
or 30 thousand or. . . ?
7 Crane researcher: It varies a lot between years and I think we
had a peak of 19,000 cranes. About a year ago, it was a little less
and this year, a peak again.
8 Farmers: But what was it 5 years ago? Ten years ago?
9 Crane researcher: Yes, it has increased, in general it has
increased.
10 Farmer B: Yes, by how much?
A few minutes later in the same meeting, a farmer posed another
question that potentially could initiate a disagreement. But again,
before any difference or similarity in perspectives is clarified,
another question is asked. Additionally, this second question
has the potential to initiate a discussion about differences or
similarities in perspectives, but as it is placed in the sequence, it
rather results in interrupting the already initiated investigation of
differences and similarities in perspectives.
1 Farmer X: How does the county administrative board view
this, with the number of cranes? If they continue to increase
significantly, is there some limit, or do you think themore they
get, the better it is?
2 Public officer: We are not happy with the idea that the more
cranes there are, the better it will be. But what we want, what
we work for, is that there will be as little crop damage done
as possible by these birds. That is what we work for. But
we cannot control the number of cranes or how they have
increased in the way they have done. But there are lots of
factors that have caused the increase.
3 Farmer Y: Our water quality must be affected, there must be
feces from those cranes that contaminates the water.
Finally, after several more sequences similar to the previous ones,
this episode erupts in one farmer expressing frustration due to
the entire situation and the difficulties of understanding and
controlling the impact of cranes on agriculture. Interestingly,
the sequence which results in this expression of frustration is
initiated by another farmer, asking yet another question, yet
another proxy for disagreement:
1 Farmer Z: Why have they increased so much from the mid-
nineties?
2 Crane researcher: So, the main reason from the start was that
they were protected in the Birds Directive in the late-seventies.
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It is certainly a combination of different things [to do] with
restoring wetlands throughout Europe, [etc.]
3 Farmers Y and X: Who should we strangle then? [laughter]
4 Officer B: The EU—politicians
5 Farmer Z: It’s a good thing one is old because it is so bloody
sluggish. A bit of common sense, and get rid of the bloody
damn bureaucracy. . .
It is as if the participants in the meeting felt that there was
a disagreement between farmers and the nature conservation
authority somewhere, and that this disagreement should be
revealed when farmers asked questions about the number of
cranes, the rate of increase of the crane population, the county
administrative board’s satisfaction and target, if the sanitation
problem had been recognized, and why the crane population had
increased. It seems that these issues were proxies for articulation
of a more fundamental disagreement, by which the farmers
felt that the nature conservation authority carried historical
responsibility for the increase in the crane population, and should
acknowledge its responsibility and ensure that population-
limiting measures were taken. However, this disagreement was
never pronounced due to the questions being answered as
request for more information or explanation, not as initiations
of disagreement about responsibility and action. That this
disagreement about the division of responsibilities was sensed by
the participants becomes visible, not least, in the question about
“Who should we strangle then?” and in the frustrated statement
about bureaucracy.
Equivocal Initiation of Disagreement Leads
to Doubts About Intersubjectivity
In our material, attempts to initiate disagreement sometimes
caused confusion for the participants about the terms of
the conversation. This, while continuing despite meta-
communication repair turns, could result in doubts about
the intersubjective conditions of the ongoing conversation.
This initiated intensive meta-communication, and sometimes
generated frustration and development of antagonism. Perhaps
it is surprising, but doubts about intersubjectivity did not,
in the observed cases, result in articulation of disagreement.
On the contrary, mutual but unclear assurances of consensus
often resulted, despite signs of continuing doubts about
intersubjectivity. We have further analyzed sequences involving
doubts about intersubjectivity in another study (Hallgren and
Bergeå, unpublished), and here we will only provide an overview
of an episode.
In a meeting about the predator-reindeer problem, the public
officer used the word “zones” as an example of measures
devised for reduced predation on reindeer. A Sami community
representative asked what the official meant when he said
zones, and suggested himself, “Do you mean for the predators?”
The official answered “Yes.” However, the conversation partner
then continued, “Or, do you mean from the perspective of
reindeer husbandry?” The officer then seemed confused and
uncertain, as if he had misunderstood the question and realized
he had already answered something that he did not mean
in the way he soon understood that it would be interpreted
by other participants in the meeting. He tried to repair the
error through meta-communication, but was again surprised
when the conversation partner did not accept the validity and
legitimacy of the answer. The Sami community representatives
then asked repeatedly if the public officer agreed with them that
the Sami community was not commissioned to be a manager
of predators, and the official said that they were in complete
agreement. Despite this mutually agreed consensus, participants
in the conversation continued to argue with each other, in parallel
with assurances that they were in agreement. It seems that they
did not know what they agreed and disagreed about, and that
attempts to clarify this did not make the disagreement clearer.
Our interpretation is that the question about the meaning of
the word “zones” was ambiguously formulated, and could be
perceived both as a question about the meaning of a concept,
as well as an initiation of disagreement about the legitimacy
of the nature conservation authority and their way of working
with reindeer-predator issues. When the public officer faced
the response from the Sami community representative, he
started to think that his response to the question had made
him appear less legitimate than he wished, and understood
that the purpose of the question was to accomplish that. He,
therefore, doubted that he had not understood the constitutive
expectancies of the conversation: Was it a conversation in
which one risked one’s legitimacy and needed to safeguard
it, or was it one where one could trust in the goodwill of
other participants? Paradoxically, this uncertainty complicated
a clear articulation of disagreement. The paradox is that the
attempt to establish a polarized disagreement led to doubts about
intersubjectivity, and thus blunted the communicative tools
for clarifying the epistemological, ontological and axiological
grounds of disagreement.
Disagreement Appears as a
Meta-Discursive Object but Is Not
Performed
As we have already commented, we did not find any sequences
where conversation participants performed disagreements that
were both clear in their content and continued after several turns.
On the other hand, participants sometimes talked about their
disagreement or conflict as an object to observe and talk about.
On a couple of occasions when the researcher who observed
and administered the recording of the meeting presented himself
as a researcher with an interest in conversation and conflicts,
attendees said, “Then you have come to the right place” and thus
implicitly indicated that they had disagreements and conflicts
to display. They performed meta-communication about the
disagreement, but did not perform it. Sometimes, they also made
a meta-communicative object of their disagreement in their
conversations with each other.
In a meeting between representatives of a Sami community
and representatives of the conservation authority, they talked
about protective culling of lynxes and how many lynxes there
were in the area. The public officer stressed that the application
for protective culling had to be well-substantiated and motivated,
for example, with regard to the documented number of lynxes in
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the area. A representative of the Sami community said that there
may be a number that was true for the Sami community, and
another number that was true for the authority, and they would
not knowwhowas right until afterwards. The Sami representative
spoke of an imaginary situation where the Sami community
and the authority disagreed about the number of lynxes and,
therefore, also about the number that should be decided on
for protective culling. However, neither the Sami community,
nor the authority made any claim of a population estimate
in the ongoing conversation and, therefore, did not report a
discrepancy. They spoke about disagreement as an anticipated
situation, but did not actually perform disagreement when doing
so.
In the same episode, the official responded to a question
about whether a number of 12 to 15 lynxes could be proposed
for protective culling. The official said that it was appropriate
to propose this number if the Sami community had support
for it, but that it was not appropriate to propose it, “just
because it sounds like a lot.” Again, this was also talk about
an anticipated situation in which the authorities and Sami
community disagreed, but was not performing disagreement.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION—LACK
OF PRACTICES AND CONSTITUTIVE
EXPECTANCIES TO PERFORM
DISAGREEMENT IN NORMATIVE
DIALOGUE
We investigated how disagreements are performed in talk-in-
interaction in dialogues about wildlife. We wanted to know
how, in this context of normative dialogue, conversations
are initiated about something that the participants disagree
on, and how they show to each other that they understand
that they disagree and about what they disagree, and what
they do when this is clear to them. We found that in the
studied normative dialogues, disagreements were initiated and
managed through six different procedures. However, despite
disagreement being initiated and indicated, it is rare for
participants to show each other what they disagree about, why
they do so and that they understand that they do so. The
six different ways they used when performing disagreement,
instead, resulted in disagreement being transformed into
consensus or creative problem solving, or to disagreement
being delayed, canceled or postponed. This result, to some
extent, mirrors(Pomerantz, 1984) result on agreement preference
in turn shapes, and (McKinlay and McVittie, 2006) findings
that disagreement in art assessment panels is communicatively
coordinated through topic jumping; conversation partners
introduce new topics or shift topic when there are differences of
opinion.
In turn, the delay in articulation of disagreement sometimes
led to the constitutive expectations of the conversation being
questioned. It is something of a paradox that pronounced
attempts to establish a polarized disagreement resulted in
doubts about intersubjectivity, and blunted the communicative
tools for clarifying the epistemological and axiological grounds
of disagreement. This last eventuality characterized all six
procedures that we observed in our material. None of
them seemed to make it possible for the participants to
clarify the epistemological and axiological grounds of the
disagreement through interactions after the third turn in three-
turn disagreement.
In our theoretical discussion on constructive conflict
and pluralistic agonism, we suggested that conflict becomes
constructive when the intersubjective ability to express
disagreement increases and actors become subsequently
better at investigating the foundations of the disagreement,
as well as revealing the power structures that the conflict is
dependent on. With the mix of interactive methods that we
have noticed being used when managing disagreements and the
interactive preference for agreement, the studied dialogues do
not contribute to more evolved investigations of disagreement,
and subsequently do not develop the conflict in constructive
direction. Still, as we notice in 4.1, sometimes disagreements
are clearly expressed and confirmed through sequences with
three or more turns, resulting in consensus or creative problem
solving in the following turns. The sequential generation of
consensus and creativity contributes by resolving practical
problems being talked about. Each time these sequences generate
consensus and creative solutions, this hopeful outcome of
a sequence of disagreements is recognized as an alternative
to maintaining the disagreement and potentially facing a
troublesome communicative sequence with unclear constitutive
expectancies. As a consequence, the communicative norm of
treating disagreement as a communicative problem, which is
preferred to be as short as possible, is reproduced and confirmed.
This norm is also apparent in meta-discourse on “win-win
negotiation” and “Getting to Yes” (Fisher et al., 1991). We are
not suggesting that each sequence in which disagreement is
transformed into consensus or creative problem solving should
be considered unproductive. Rather the problem occurs when
these sequences appear together with other practices that delay
or postpone disagreement, and more importantly, when we
see no communicative practices initiating, maintaining, and
investigating the foundations of conflict. Transformation to
consensus and postponed disagreements together inhibit the
creation of agonistic pluralism; as (Mouffe (1996), p. 8) phrase
it: “envisaging the diversity of conceptions of the good, not as
something negative that should be suppressed but as something
to be valued and celebrated.” When the communicative
norms and procedures indicate that disagreement needs to be
transformed into consensus, and if not, it will be delayed or
postponed, then the diversity of conceptions of good will not be
“celebrated.”
Our results indicate that the routines and procedures for
communication that characterize normative dialogue make it
difficult to communicate about disagreements and to make
disagreement clear. It also turns out that, in some cases,
this discrepancy between actors’ wishes to clarify disagreement
and the resistance imbedded in communicative routines and
procedures toward doing so, generates frustration and confusion.
It appears that normativity in dialogue does not support an
agonistic approach to conflict and dialogue. In order to avoid
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situations where dialogue leads to discursive closures, standards
and procedures that facilitate articulation of disagreement need
to be developed; otherwise dialogue risks becoming a tool for
what Cooke and Kothari (2001) has called “participation as
tyranny,” that is, when participatory procedures maintain, and
hide, the power structures they, on paper, intended to overcome.
When dialogue is normed as consensus and communicative
procedures to actually articulate disagreements are missing,
the power structures that were revealed and challenged when
the conflict were articulated, will again be hidden by the
dialogue procedure. Perhaps this normativity can be changed
by expressing the value of disagreement in the meeting, and
by giving space in the meeting design for performing and
investigating disagreement.
But it may also be appropriate to include a disclaimer
here. In our study of the conditions for agonistic dialogue, we
assumed that agonism arises when disagreement is pronounced
in such a way that the disagreeing actors themselves understand
the difference in ontological, epistemological and axiological
assumptions. Our results have shown that, due to the
communicative routines used by participants in normative
dialogue, they rarely succeed in doing so. But when we assume
this mutual understanding of difference to be possible, we
are perhaps only reproducing a heritage of communicative
rationality (Habermas, 2001) and a desire for ordered processes.
Perhaps this is a remission for fear of antagonism and chaos.
However, although Mouffe has not been very specific about
forms for agonistic communication, except when suggesting
provocative art (Mouffe, 2007), she has argued for consensus
in procedural matters. This ought to include forms to express
disagreement and methods for common clarification of the
nature of disagreement. In agonistic dialogue others’ “ideasmight
be fought, even fiercely, but [their] right to defend those ideas is
not to be questioned” (Mouffe, 2013, p. 7). In the situations we
have observed, this “fight” is somehow muﬄed through strong
intersubjective norms for reciprocation, which hide the content
of disagreement.
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